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I) Introduction
There has been a vigorous debate on the impact of uncertainty on the Great Recession and 
recovery. While organizations like the IMF, the OECD, the EU and the Federal Reserve Board 
claim uncertainty has worsened the Great Recession and recovery, others like Paul Krugman 
have argued this is a smoke screen for bad policy and insufficient demand. There appears to be 
as much uncertainty about uncertainty itself as about the economy. 
More generally at the micro level does uncertainty hold back investment and hiring as many 
firms and business lobbies claim? Or instead maybe it is essential for innovation as success 
stories built on risk-taking like Silicon Valley suggest? 
This article tries to answer four questions: 
i. What are the stylized facts about uncertainty over time?
ii. Why does uncertainty vary?
iii. Do fluctuations in uncertainty matter?
iv. Has higher uncertainty worsened the Great Recession and recovery?
In summary, on the first question both macro and micro uncertainty appears to vary strongly over 
time, rising sharply in recessions and falling in booms. It also varies heavily across countries – 
developing countries appear to have about a third more macro uncertainty than developed 
countries. On the second question two mechanisms appear to drive changes in uncertainty over 
time. First, the types of exogenous shocks that often cause recessions – like wars, oil price jumps 
and financial panics – appear to directly increase uncertainty. Uncertainty also appears to 
endogenously rise further during recessions, as economic slowdowns increase micro and macro 
volatility. On the third question the evidence suggests uncertainty is damaging for short-run 
growth, reducing firms’ willingness to hire and invest, and consumers’ willingness to spend. 
However, there is also some evidence that uncertainty can stimulate R&D – faced with a more 
uncertain future some firms appear more willing to innovate. Finally, in terms of the impact of 
uncertainty on the Great Recession, a 2008 jump in uncertainty was likely an important factor 
exacerbating the size of the contraction, accounting for maybe one third of the drop in GDP. 
From 2010 onwards uncertainty appears to have waned, although US policy uncertainty remains 
high due to the ongoing fiscal debates, potentially slowing the recovery. 
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II) What are the stylized facts about uncertainty over time? 
First, what is uncertainty? 
Frank Knight (1921) defined uncertainty as peoples’ inability to forecast the likelihood of events 
happening. For example, the number of items in my wallet as I write this is article uncertain – it 
is hard for you to assign a sensible probability distribution to this. In contrast Knight defined risk 
as peoples known probability distribution over known events. For example, the outcome from 
flipping a coin is risky - you can assign a 50% chance to heads and a 50% chance to tails for a 
fair toss. In this article I’ll refer to a single concept of uncertainty, although this will typically be 
a stand in for both risk and uncertainty.  
How do we measure uncertainty? 
Uncertainty is hard to measure since it is intrinsically unobservable concept. It reflects the 
uncertainty in the minds of consumers, managers and policymakers about possible futures. It is 
also a broad concept – reflecting uncertainty over macro phenomena like GDP growth, over 
micro phenomena like firm-growth, and over non-economic events like war and climate change. 
So not surprisingly there is no one perfect measure of uncertainty, but a range of proxies like 
stock-market and GDP volatility2, forecaster disagreement, news mentions of “uncertainty” and 
firm TFP shock dispersion. Collectively these proxies suggest four stylized facts about 
uncertainty.3  
Fact 1): Macro uncertainty rises in recessions 
The volatility of stock-markets, bond-markets, exchange rates and GDP growth all rise steeply in 
recessions. In fact almost every macroeconomic indicator of uncertainty I know – from 
disagreement amongst professional forecasters to the frequency of the word "uncertain” in the 
New York Times (Alexopolous and Cohen, 2009) – appears to be countercyclical. 
                                                            
2 Typically when a series – like the S&P500 stock-market index or GDP growth – is more volatile it is harder to 
forecast. So volatility is often used as an empirical proxy for uncertainty.  
3 All the data used in this paper is available here: www.stanford.edu/~nbloom/JEPdata.zip 
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For example, Figure 1 shows the VIX index of 30-day implied volatility on the S&P 500 stock-
market index. This implied volatility index is the market’s expectation of volatility over the next 
30-days backed out from options prices. The VIX index is clearly counter-cyclical, rising by 
58% on average in NBER recessions. One explanation for this is the effect of leverage - in 
recessions firms take on more debt and this increases their stock-returns volatility. However, as 
pointed out by Schwert (1989) the leverage effect can explain at most 10% of this rise in 
uncertainty during recessions. Another explanation is risk-aversion - increased risk aversion will 
increase the prices of options (which provide insurance), raising implied volatility. However, as 
Bekaert, Hoerova and Lo Duca (2013) note the fluctuations in the VIX appear to heavily reflect 
movements in uncertainty. Other financial prices, like exchange-rates and bond yields, are 
similarly more volatile in recessions. Non-financial measures of macro uncertainty include the 
volatility of quarterly GDP and industrial production growth, which based on GARCH models 
have about 35% more conditional volatility in recessions. 
An alternative proxy of uncertainty is disagreement amongst professional forecasters. Periods 
when banks, industry and professional forecasters hold more diverse opinions are likely to reflect 
greater uncertainty. If everyone agreed on the path of future GDP it seems likely the future is 
predictable, while if professionals strongly disagree it seems likely it is harder to predict. 
Examining data from the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Boards’ panel of about 50 forecasters 
shows that between 1968 and 2012 the standard-deviation across forecasts of industrial 
production growth was 64% higher in recessions, similar to results from other European 
countries (Bachmann, Elstner, and Sims, 2010). 
A related proxy is how uncertain forecasters are about their own forecasts, which is called 
subjective forecast uncertainty. The Philadelphia Federal Reserve has since 1992 asked 
forecasters to provide probabilities for GDP growth (in percent) falling into ten different bins: 
“<-2”, “-2 to -1.1”, “-1 to -0.1” up to “6+”. We plot the mean of forecasters’ uncertainty 
calculated using this probabilities on Figure 2 (blue line, circles) alongside the mean of 
forecasters’ mean (green line, crosses), plus for comparison the disagreement across forecasters’ 
mean (red line, squares). We see that both uncertainty and disagreement more than doubled when 
growth fell sharply in 2008/2009, with a milder rise of about 50% during the recession of 2001.  
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Another proxy for uncertainty is the frequency of newspaper articles about economic 
uncertainty. Figure 3 shows the Baker, Bloom and Davis (2013) measure of economic policy 
uncertainty, which counts the frequency of articles containing the words "uncertain or 
uncertainty" and "economy or economics" and one of six policy words in ten leading US 
newspapers. Again, this is clearly countercyclical rising by 51% during recessions. A related 
proxy for uncertainty is the count of the word “uncertain” in the Federal Reserve’s Beige Book. 
The Beige Book is a 15,000 word overview of the US economy published after each FOMC 
meeting, which Baker et al (2013) report includes the word “uncertainty” 52% more often during 
recessions. 
Finally, an eclectic mix of other indicators of macro uncertainty also rise in recessions. One 
approach followed by Scotti (2013) is to measure the size of the surprise when economic data is 
released – that is compare the pre-release date expectations for things like non-farm payroll and 
quarterly GDP with their release values. Interestingly, she finds these surprises are almost 20% 
larger in recession. Another approach followed by Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2013) is to use 
data on hundreds of monthly economic series in a system of forecasting equations and look at the 
implied forecast errors. They found this rises dramatically in large recessions, most notably the 
OPEC I recession (1973-1974), the early 1980s rust-belt recession (1982-1982) and the Great 
Recession (2007-2009). A third approach by Nakamura, Sergeyev and Steinsson (2012) uses 
over 100 years of consumption data from 16 OECD countries to estimate short and long run 
fluctuations in volatility, again finding this rises strikingly in periods of lower growth. 
Fact 2): Micro uncertainty rises in recessions 
We can also examine micro uncertainty at different levels: industry, firm, plant or even 
individual product level. At every level uncertainty appears to rise during recessions. That is the 
story is fractal, at each level of disaggregation uncertainty rises in recession just like it does at 
the level above. 
For example, Figure 4 shows the percentiles of industry output growth for a panel of almost 200 
manufacturing industries followed by the Federal Reserve Board. During recessions these 
percentiles widen out, as some industries do well while others get hit hard. This increased 
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dispersion is a proxy for industry level uncertainty as it suggests that industries are getting larger 
industry-level shocks during recessions.  
Drilling down to firm and plant level outcomes, we again find uncertainty proxied by dispersion 
surges in recessions. For example, Campbell et al. (2001) report how cross-firm stock-return 
variation is almost 50% higher in recession than booms. In the NBER industry uncertainty data 
we see that the dispersion of plant-level TFP shocks rises sharply in recessions, which Kehrig 
(2011) shows is particularly striking in durable producing industries. Figure 5 shows this 
graphically, plotting the spread of sales growth rates for a balanced panel of about 16,000 plants 
within the US manufacturing for 2008-2009 (the red solid-line) against their values for 2005-
2006 (the black dashed-line). We can see that the variance of plant growth rates rose by 152% 
during the Great Recession compared to the years just before. 
Amazingly, digging all the way down to individual product prices, we again find a similar story. 
Berger and Vavra (2012) analyzed price changes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics on 10,000s 
of products – such as a 1 liter bottle of Coke or a pack of 4 Duracell AAA batteries – and found 
these were about 50% more volatile during recessions.  
This increase in both macro and micro uncertainty during recessions is true both for the US and 
on the global scale. For example, Figure 6 plots five different measures of uncertainty against the 
country GDP growth decile for 60 developed and developing countries. All five of these 
measures are higher when country growth is below their long-run average. This is true even 
when breaking down the sample into developed and developing countries, so counter-cyclical 
uncertainty seems to be a global stylized fact. Interestingly, the relationship is strongest for the 
bottom 5 deciles of growth, particularly the lowest decile where growth is negative on average. 
Hence, it appears that recessions (periods of negative growth) are particularly strongly associated 
with heightened uncertainty. 
Fact 3): Wages and income volatility appear to be countercyclical 
Increased uncertainty is not just an issue for firms and financial markets in the recession but also 
for households. In particular, wages and incomes also appear to be more volatility in recessions. 
Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) and Heathcote, Perri and Violante (2009) show how wage volatility 
appears to rise in recessions, while Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004) report how cohorts of 
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individuals that have lived through more recessions have more dispersed incomes. Likewise, 
Guvenen, Ozkan and Song’s (2013) analysis of the US Social Security Administration data from 
1978 to 2010 reveals higher income volatility in recessions, driven mainly by an increasingly 
negative skewness as the bottom end of the income distribution collapses in recessions. So 
whatever factors appear to be increasing the volatility of macro, industry, firm and plant level 
outcomes in recessions these also translate to high volatility of wages for employees too. 
Fact 4): Uncertainty is higher in developing countries 
A long literature has highlighted how developing countries in regions like Africa and South 
America have more volatile GDP growth, stock-markets and exchange rates than developed 
countries in regions like Europe and North America. This was in fact the theme for the World 
Bank’s 2013 Development Report “Risk and Opportunity”, focusing on how households and 
firms in developing countries face a huge variety of macro and micro risks. In a panel of 60 
countries with GDP and stock-market data I find that the developing countries (the 17 countries 
with less than $10,000 GDP per capita) had 50% higher volatility of GDP growth rates, 12% 
higher stock-market volatility and 35% more volatile bond than the developed countries (so 
around a third more volatility on average). 
Finally, there have also been two lines of work investigating the presence of longer-runs trends 
in US volatility. One focused on the “Great Moderation” of macro volatility which began in the 
early 1980s (Stock and Watson, 2002), although this drop in macro volatility appears to have 
ended with the recession of 2007-2009. The other focused on the falling volatility of firm growth 
rates, which has occurred across all sectors from the late 1970s onwards, and appears to be (at 
least partly) explained by the gradual aging of firms and their employees (Davis et al. 2006).  
 
III) Why does uncertainty vary? 
While it appears clear that uncertainty rises in recessions (and is higher in developing countries), 
it is much less clear why this occurs. This is an important and active area of current research, and 
as such I will try to summarize the current state of play.  
8 
 
One simple explanation is that the types of bad events that cause recessions – like terrorist 
attacks, wars and oil-price shocks – also cause higher uncertainty at the same time. That is, 
recessions are caused by a combination of bad news (first moment shocks) and uncertainty 
(second moment shocks). For example, the 1973 OPEC oil embargo tipped the US recession by 
tripling oil-prices and increasing uncertainty over future oil prices. Interestingly, while bad 
events which cause recessions typically increase uncertainty the same appears to hold in reverse 
– almost all events which increase uncertainty appear to be bad news. For example, Bloom 
(2009) defined 17 uncertainty shocks from 1962 to 2008 on the basis of jumps in stock-market 
volatility, and found that all but one was bad-news in that they lowered expected growth. These 
uncertainty shocks included the Gulf wars, the assassination of JFK, the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
the 9/11 attack, the OPEC oil price shocks, and the Asian and Russian financial crises. In fact the 
only uncertainty shock in this series associated with good news was the October 1982 business 
cycle turning point, a relatively minor uncertainty shock. 
So in summary, bad news shocks and uncertainty shocks appear to be closely tied together. One 
possible reason is that when good news events occur – like the fall of the Berlin Wall or the 
development of the internet – these are too gradual to cause jumps in uncertainty. 
Another potential explanation for uncertainty rising in recessions is that recessions themselves 
increase uncertainty. That is, not only are recessions caused by a combination of bad news and 
uncertainty, but as growth slows uncertainty is endogenously increased further. For example, 
growth and good times may help economic agents to collect information to forecast the future. 
When business is good firms are trading actively, which helps to generate and spread 
information, as Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2006) and particularly Fajgelbaum et al. 
(2012) emphasize. When business is bad this activity slows down, reducing the flow of new 
information thereby raising uncertainty. 
A third potential explanation, which matches the recent experience of policy activism in the 
Great Recession, lays the blame at the feet of Governments and Central Banks. Lubos and Pastor 
(2012) argue that policy becomes more uncertain during recessions because policy makers want 
to experiment. When the economy is doing well politicians prefer to keep with their current 
policies which appear to be successful. This is simply the old adage of “if it aint broke don’t fix 
it”. But when the economy turns down politicians are tempted to experiment as they attempt to 
9 
 
revive growth. So policy-uncertainty is the side effect of the search for policies to revive growth. 
As a result policy uncertainty rises in recessions, as found empirically by Baker at al. (2013).  
Another potential reason for higher uncertainty in recessions is that individuals are more 
confident in predicting the future when the economy is growing. “Business as usual” is an easier 
prediction to make when growth is normal. But when sudden events cause recessions forecasters 
have to predict something different from the usual pattern of positive growth, and they find it 
harder to make forecasts (Orlik and Veldkamp, 2012). This arises from the fact that recessions 
are rare events, so that people are unfamiliar with them. 
Finally, another set of explanations focus on micro-uncertainty. Bachman and Moscarini (2011) 
and D’Erasmo and Moscoso Boedo (2011) argue that recessions are good times to experiment 
and spend on R&D. When business is slack it is cheap to try out new ideas and this leads to 
heightened micro-uncertainty, potentially feeding into higher macro uncertainty. 
As for higher uncertainty in developing countries Koren and Tenereyo (2007) and the World 
Bank Development Report (2013) argue this comes from three mechanisms. First, developing 
countries tend to have a more concentrated industrial structure so that shocks to individual 
industries hurt them more. For example, many industrial countries export only a few products so 
they are heavily exposed to fluctuations in their price. Second, the industries developing 
countries focus on tend to also be more volatile, often commodities products like rubber, sugar, 
oil and copper. Finally, developing countries appear to have more domestic political shocks like 
coups, revolutions and wars, are more susceptible to natural disasters like epidemics, typhoons 
and floods, and have less effective fiscal and monetary stabilization policies.  
 
IV) Do fluctuations in uncertainty matter? 
There is a large empirical literature on the short-run impact of uncertainty, which I discuss 
below. In summary, the literature finds that uncertainty is damaging for short-run (quarterly and 
annual) growth, reducing output, investment, hiring, consumption and trade. Intriguingly, some 
recent evidence hints, however, that uncertainty may stimulate R&D spending due to growth 
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options effects (the idea that uncertainty increases the potential upside from innovative new 
products), so that the impact of uncertainty on longer-run growth is less clear. 
I then discuss the theoretical literature which emphasizes three negative channels of uncertainty: 
(i) real-options effects which act to make firms more cautious about hiring and investing, and 
consumers more cautious about buying durables, (ii) risk-premium effects which act to raise the 
cost of finance and (iii) precautionary savings effects which act to reduce consumption spending. 
But the theory also highlights two positive effect of uncertainty on growth: (i) growth options 
whereby higher uncertainty promotes investment by expanding the upside of future outcomes, 
and (ii) the Oi-Hartman-Abel effect, which highlights the fact that firms may expand when 
responding to positive shocks and contract when responding to negative shocks, so that a mean 
preserving spreads in outcomes can increase average output. 
Empirical Literature: 
The classic macro study is Ramey and Ramey (1995) who showed a strong negative association 
between volatility and growth in cross country regressions. They found a one standard deviation 
increase in volatility was associated with a 0.5% reduction in annual growth. This negative 
volatility effect on growth has been confirmed in a number of subsequent studies using more 
advanced estimations techniques (Engel and Rangel, 2008)), or using natural disasters and 
political shocks as instruments for uncertainty (Baker and Bloom, 2013). It has also been 
extended to other macro outcomes, revealing that uncertainty is associated with lower consumer 
spending (Romer 1990), investment and hiring (Bloom, 2009), and trade (Handley and Limao, 
2012, and Novy and Taylor, 2012). 
There is also a micro literature focusing on the impact of uncertainty on individual firms and 
households, again typically finding a negative impact. For example, Leahy and Whited (1996) 
examined a panel of US publicly listed firms finding a strong relationship between uncertainty 
proxied by stock-market volatility and investment, confirmed in UK data using lagged outcomes 
as instruments by Bloom, Bond and Van Reenen (2007). Guiso and Parigi (1999) used Italian 
data on firms’ dispersion of subjective future demand expectations to measure uncertainty, again 
finding a large negative relationship between uncertainty and investment. More recently Stone 
and Stein (2012) used firms’ exposure to exogenous variations in energy and currency volatility 
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as an instrument for uncertainty, again finding this depresses investment, hiring and advertising. 
Interestingly, Stone and Stein (2012) find, however, that uncertainty seems to increase R&D 
spending, something that growth options – the idea the more uncertainty yields a larger upside 
for long-run growth – can explain.  
Theoretical Literature: 
Real options: The largest body of theoretical literature focuses on real-options, which goes back 
at least to Bernanke (1983), Brennan and Schwartz (1985), McDonald and Siegel (1986), and 
Dixit and Pindyck (1994). The idea is that firms have a series of put-options on potential new 
investments. For example, a supermarket chain that owns an empty plot of land has the call-
option to build a new store on the plot. If the supermarket is uncertain about the future – because 
for example, it is unsure if a local housing development will go ahead – the best action may be to 
wait. If the housing development proceeds the supermarket can develop the site, and if not it can 
continue to wait having avoided a costly mistake. In the language of real options, the option-
value of delay for the supermarket chain is high when uncertainty is high. As a result uncertainty 
makes firms cautious about actions like investment and hiring, which adjustment costs often 
make expensive to reverse.  
Investment adjustment costs are both physical (equipment may get damaged in installation and 
removal) and the used-good discount on resale. Ramey and Shapiro (2001) and Cooper and 
Haltiwanger (2006) estimate these investment adjustment costs are extremely large at roughly 
50% of the value of capital.4 Hiring adjustment costs include recruitment, training and severance 
pay, which Nickell (1986) and Bloom (2009) estimate are about 10% to 20% of annual wages. 
Schaal (2013) also emphasizes search frictions, showing how uncertainty can interact with 
search-costs to impede labor markets in recessions. 
Real-options effects are not universal however. They rely first on the fact that decisions cannot 
be easily reversed, otherwise actions do not lead to the loss of an option. For example, hiring a 
part-time employee is typically easy for a firm to reverse – part-time employees generally have 
                                                            
4 The literature distinguishes two families of adjustment costs. There are lumpy “non-convex” adjustments costs, 
which are fixed-costs (a one-off cost to buy/sell capital) and partial irreversibility (a cost per unit of capital sold). 
These “non-convex” adjustment costs generate real options effects. There are also smooth “convex” adjustment 
costs like quadratic adjustment costs (a cost that increases in the squared rate of investment), which do not generate 
real options. 
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very light hiring and firing costs. As a result firms may be happy to hire part-time employees 
even when uncertainty is extremely high, because if conditions deteriorate they can easily lay-off 
these employees. In fact, since part-time employees are so flexible firms may switch from hiring 
full-time to part-time employees during periods of high uncertainty. This often happens in 
recessions (Valetta and Bengali, 2013) which as we saw in section II are periods of high 
uncertainty.  
Real-options effects also rely on firms having the ability to wait. But if firms are racing, for 
example to be the first to patent a new idea or launch a new product, this option disappears. 
Imagine the market for online books in the mid-1990s when the internet was beginning to 
emerge. Any entrepreneur considering launching an on-line book retailer – like Amazon’s Jeff 
Bezos – would want to be early to market because of network economies. As a result delay 
would be extremely costly, so the option to delay would not have been valuable, breaking the 
negative real-options effect of uncertainty on investment.  
Finally, real options require that actions that are taken now influence the returns to actions taken 
later, which in the most extreme case is a binary decision to invest now or invest later (but not 
both). For example, building a new supermarket on the plot of land can only be undertaken once. 
But in some situations - like firms producing with a constant returns to scale technology and 
selling into a perfectly competitive market – the choice of investment this period will have no 
impact on the profitability of investment next period, leading to no option value from waiting. So 
another requirement of the real-options literature is that firms are selling into imperfectly 
competitive markets and/or operating with a decreasing returns to scale technology. 
Uncertainty not only reduces levels of investment and hiring, but also makes firms less sensitive 
to business conditions drivers like demand, prices and productivity.5 So, for example, in low-
uncertainty periods the elasticity of investment with respect to interest rates might be -1 (a drop 
of interest rates from 10% to 9% would stimulate 10% more investment) but when uncertainty is 
very high this could fall to -0.25 (the same drop would only stimulate 2.5% more investment). 
As a result high uncertainty can reduce the impact of stimulus policies like interest rate and tax 
                                                            
5 Formally the levels effect (also called the delay effect) is ∂I/∂σ <0 whereby uncertainty (σ) reduces investment (I), 
and the sensitivity effect (also called the caution effect) is ∂2I/∂σ∂A <0 whereby uncertainty makes firms less 
responsive to productivity or demand conditions (A).  
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cuts. This makes the increases in uncertainty that occur in recessions particularly challenging for 
policy makers. Just as the economy is heading into recession, higher uncertainty makes the usual 
monetary and fiscal stabilization tools less effective. The implications of this are twofold: (i) any 
given stimulus policy needs to be larger to overcomes firms’ reduced sensitivity during periods 
of high uncertainty; and (ii) the ideal response to a second moment (uncertainty) shock may 
involve second moment policy, for example, a financial stabilization package to reduce systemic 
risk.  
This channel of uncertainty reducing firms’ responsiveness also leads to endogenously 
procyclical productivity, an empirical regularity that is central to many modern studies of 
business cycles (King and Rebelo, 1999). The reason is as follows: when uncertainty is high, 
productive firms are less aggressive in expanding and unproductive firms are less aggressive in 
contracting. This produces a chilling effect on productivity-enhancing reallocation of resources 
across firms. Since this reallocation appears to drive the majority of aggregate productivity 
growth6, higher uncertainty can stall productivity growth. This productivity impact of uncertainty 
shocks underlies the theories of uncertainty driven business cycles, which emphasize how 
uncertainty shocks reduce investment, hiring and productivity (Bloom et al. 2013). The 
difference with more traditional real business cycle models (e.g. Kydland and Prescott, 1982) is 
that the fall in productivity growth in an outcome of the uncertainty shock, rather than the shock 
itself. 
Finally, turning from investment to consumption, there is an analogous channel for uncertainty to 
slow economic growth. When consumers are making decisions on buying durables like housing, 
cars, and furniture, they can usually delay purchases relatively easily. For example, they may be 
thinking about moving house but could either move this year or wait until next year. This option 
value of waiting will be much more valuable when income uncertainty is higher – if, for 
example, you are unsure about a major-promotion at the end of this year it makes sense to wait 
until this is decided before undertaking an expensive house move.7 This channel is emphasized 
by Carol and Dunn (1997) who argue that one reason why unemployment reduces consumption 
                                                            
6 See Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2000) and (2006) on the importance of reallocation for driving 50%+ and 
80%+ of productivity growth in manufacturing and retail respectively. 
7 Delaying purchases of non-durable like food and entertainment is harder, so the real-options effects of uncertainty 
on non-durable consumption will be lower. 
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is the increase in income uncertainty this generates. Like the investment literature, higher 
uncertainty should also make consumers’ durable expenditure less sensitive to demand and 
prices signals, something both Foote, Hurst and Leahy (2000) and Bertola, Guiso and Pistaferri 
(2005) report in studies of US and Italian consumers. 
Risk-premia: A second channel by which uncertainty can reduce growth is through increasing 
risk premia. As James Tobin pointed out investors want to be compensated for higher risk, and as 
uncertainty rises this should raise the cost of finance. To the extent that investors are diversified 
it will be the systemic (rather than idiosyncratic) component of uncertainty that will raise 
financing costs.  
A related mechanism to risk-premia is that uncertainty increases the cost of debt finance by 
raising the probability of default, by expanding the size of the left-tail default outcomes. Since 
banks only care about being repaid a mean-preserving spread worsens their return on loans. As a 
result as the risk of default goes up banks will charge higher interest rates. This can reduce micro 
and macro growth, especially if there are dead-weight losses from bankruptcy, as emphasized in 
papers on the impact of uncertainty in the presence of financial constraints (Arellano, Bai and 
Kehoe, 2010; Christiano, Motto and Rostagno, 2009; and Gilchrist, Sims and Zakrasjek, 2010). 
Another related mechanism is the confidence effect of uncertainty in models where consumers 
have worst-case beliefs (Ilut and Schneider, 2011). In these models agents are so uncertain about 
the future they cannot even form a probability distribution. Instead they have a range of possible 
outcomes and act as if the worst outcomes will occur, displaying a behavior known as ambiguity 
aversion. So as the range of possible outcomes (uncertainty) increases agents become more 
pessimistic, cutting back on investment and hiring. Of course if agents are excessively optimistic, 
as is sometimes suggested in the CEO literature (e.g. Malmendier and Tate, 2005) then this result 
can reverse, with uncertainty increasing growth.  
Precautionary savings: The third major channel for uncertainty to impact growth is from 
consumers’ desire for precautionary saving, which itself reduces consumption expenditure (e.g. 
Bansal and Yaron, 2004). While this potentially increases long-run growth by encouraging 
investment, in most open economies some of this increased saving will flow abroad, reducing 
domestic demand. One recent paper emphasizing this route is by Fernandez-Villaverde et al. 
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(2011) who argue that rising uncertainty can be crippling for growth, particularly in smaller 
highly open countries. They argue that countries like Argentina and Ecuador are damaged by 
higher uncertainty which leads domestic savers to move money abroad, reducing local 
investment.  
Interestingly, however, the impact of this risk channel is less clear in the case of larger and more 
closed countries like the US. In a fully closed economy if rising uncertainty leads consumers to 
increase their level of savings this should push down interest rates, raising investment rates. So 
while higher uncertainty would reduce consumption it would simultaneously increase 
investment. Of course this feels intuitively wrong – uncertainty is seen as bad for growth rather 
than as a driver of investment fueled booms.  
As Leduc and Liu (2012) and Basu and Bundick (2013) have pointed out, however, using New 
Keynesian models which allow prices to be sticky leads uncertainty shocks to cut both 
consumption and investment, by preventing prices falling enough to clear markets. In their 
models and a related paper by Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2013) uncertainty is particularly 
damaging if other policy tools – like interest rates - are ineffective, because interest rates are 
constrained at zero. 
Another precautionary effect of uncertainty will impact the CEOs of firms. Most CEOs are not 
well diversified – they typically hold financial assets (stocks and options) as well human-assets 
(future earnings) in their firm. Hence, when uncertainty is high they may become more cautious 
in making long-run investments. For example, the CEO of an oil exploration company may 
become increasingly nervous when the price of oil becomes volatile, leading them to take a more 
cautious position on explorations and growth. As  Panousi and Pananikolaou (2012) have shown 
in a panel of US firms when uncertainty is higher investment drops, particularly in firms where 
the CEOs hold extensive equity in the firm and so are highly exposed to firm-level risk. 
Growth Options: 
Uncertainty can also potentially have a positive impact on growth. One way is through “Growth 
options”, which highlight how in some circumstances uncertainty can even encourage investment 
if it increases the size of potential prize. Papers like Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) note that if 
firms have long delays in completing projects, for example because of time-to-build, then 
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uncertainty have a positive effect on investment. For example, a pharmaceutical company 
developing a new drug may be encouraged by a mean-preserving increase demand uncertainty. 
Bad draws (i.e. the drug turns out to be unsafe) are capped from below since the firm can cancel 
the product losing only its sunk R&D costs. Good draws, however, are unconstrained and 
increasing in upside risk as this raises the expected profit when the product goes to market.8 
Growth options were often invoked to explain the dot-com boom of the late 1990s. Firms were 
unsure about the internet, but that extreme uncertainty encouraged  investment. The worst 
outcome for firms starting new websites was losing their development costs, while the best 
outcome was dependent on the success of the internet which increased with uncertainty. Since 
developing websites took time, building one was seen as investing in a “call-option” on the 
future success of internet. Likewise a literature on the value of oil drilling leases shows how 
these are call-options on possible future extraction so oil price uncertainty increases their value 
(Paddock, Siegel and Smith, 1988). 
Oi-Hartman-Abel Effects:  
There is a second channel which uncertainty can potentially increase growth, which was 
emphasized in the early work by Oi (1961), Hartman (1972) and Abel (1983). This “Oi-
Hartman-Abel” effect highlights the fact that firms can expand to exploit good outcomes and 
contract to insure against bad outcomes, making them potentially risk loving. For example, if a 
factory can easily halve production volumes if the price of its products falls and double 
production volumes if the price rises, it should like a mean-preserving increase in uncertainty. 
The factory is partly-insured against bad-outcomes (by being able to contract) and has the option 
to expand on good outcomes (by being able to expand). Formally, if profits are convex in 
demand or costs then demand or cost uncertainty increases expected profits. However, for this 
mechanism to work firms need to be able to easily expand or contract in response to good or bad 
news, so while the Oi-Hartman-Able effects are typically not very strong in the short-run 
(because of adjustment costs) in the medium and long-run they can be more powerful. 
                                                            
8 This is sometimes called the “good news principle” that only good news matters in growth-options as bad news is 
capped by closing down the project. The origin of this phrase comes in fact from Bernanke (1983) who discussed 
the reverse “bad news principle” in terms of the classic real-options negative effects of uncertainty on investment. 
Segal, Shaliastovich and Yaron (2013) find interesting evidence for both these good news (growth option) and bad 
news (real option) effects of uncertainty in aggregate investment. 
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V) Has higher uncertainty worsened the Great Recession and recovery? 
Finally, in terms of the impact of uncertainty on the depth of and recovery from the Great 
Recession the evidence is still speculative, and additional research would be valuable.  
What we know so far is that every measure of economic uncertainty rose sharply in the 2008. 
These measures remained extremely high throughout 2008 and well into 2009, generating a 
massive and persistent uncertainty shock to the US economy. But from 2010 onwards many 
measures of uncertainty have fallen back, although policy-uncertainty appears to have remained 
stubbornly high through-out 2013 due to the ongoing battles in Congress. 
This suggests that, firstly, there was a massive spike in uncertainty following the housing and 
financial crisis in 2008, with started to recede in 2010. Second this spike in uncertainty was an 
important factor driving the depths of the Great Recession. Based on simulations and empirical 
estimations, I estimate this spike in uncertainty reduced GDP by about 3% over this period, 
accounting for maybe one third of the 9% drop in GDP against trend that the US experienced 
during 2008-2009.9 The reasons for this surge in uncertainty during 2008-2009 are two-fold, 
reflecting uncertainty’s role as an impulse and propagation mechanism for recessions. 
Firstly, the shocks precipitating the Great Recession – the financial crisis and the housing 
collapse – themselves directly increased uncertainty. That burst of uncertainty was part of the 
initial impulse that caused the recession. This uncertainty occurred because it was not clear 
initially how serious the financial and housing problems were, what their impact would be 
nationally and globally, or what the appropriate policy responses should be. Hence, these events 
directly increased uncertainty among firms and consumers. So in statistical terms the financial 
and housing crises were a nasty combination of large negative first moment and large positive 
second moment shocks. Together these led to the largest recession since the Great Depression of 
                                                            
9 This 9% drop in GDP is taken from the difference between the prior trend 3.1% growth rate of real GDP from 
1980 to 2007 and the -1.45% growth over 2008 and 2009. The estimated 3% contribution of uncertainty comes from 
simulation and empirical estimations. Simulation: From Bloom et al. (2013) take the -1.3% average drop in GDP in 
the year after an average recessionary uncertainty shock (Figure 6), and note that the increase in uncertainty around 
2008-2009 was more than triple “normal” levels and about twice as persistent (Figure 3). Estimation: From Bloom 
(2009) take the vector-auto regression estimates (Figure 2) which show output falls by about 1% after an average 
uncertainty shock, and note that the 2008-2009 uncertainty shock was about three times the average size (Figure 1). 
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1929-1932. In fact, looking back to the Great Depression we see a similar situation – the 
financial meltdown and banking crisis starting in 1929 was both bad news (a negative first 
moment shock) and also induced massive uncertainty (a second moment shock).  
Secondly, I think the Great Recession itself further increased uncertainty, leading the initial 
slowdown to be propagated and amplified over time. This was because of the necessarily 
aggressive monetary and fiscal policies aimed at mitigating the downturn (Baker, Bloom and 
Davis 2013) and the increasing business and individual uncertainty about future growth.  
From 2010 onwards the picture is more complex since the measures of uncertainty have 
diverged. While many financial and output measure of uncertainty have dropped back, policy 
uncertainty appears to have remained high due to the ongoing uncertainty over the long-run size 
and reach of the Government. This has probably played some role in the slow recovery from the 
Great Recession, but this is hard to evaluate and is an area of ongoing research.  
 
VI) Conclusions 
In summary, there appears to be some two broad stylized facts on uncertainty. First, both micro 
and macro uncertainty are strongly countercyclical, rising in recessions and falling in booms. 
Second, uncertainty is substantially higher - maybe around a third - in developing countries. 
Uncertainty rises in recessions partly because the types of shocks which cause recessions – like 
wars, oil price shocks and financial panics – also themselves increase uncertainty. So an increase 
in uncertainty is typically part of the initial impulse that leads to recessions. But uncertainty also 
appears to be a propagation and amplification mechanism, since economic slowdowns appear to 
induce yet more uncertainty. 
In terms of the impact of uncertainty both the macro and micro literature suggests it has a 
strongly negative short-run impact on growth, reducing investment, hiring, and consumption. In 
the longer-run the impact of uncertainty is less clear, as uncertainty has some potentially positive 
effects on R&D.  
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Finally, the onset of the Great Recession was accompanied by a massive surge in uncertainty. 
The size of this uncertainty shock was so large it potentially accounted for around one third of 
the 9% drop in GDP versus trend during 2008-2009. In early 2010 uncertainty started to recede, 
but this fall has been moderated by rising policy uncertainty as Congress wrestles with sweeping 
fiscal reforms. 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
Bibliography: 
Abel, Andrew (1983). “Optimal investment under uncertainty”. The American Economic Re- 
view 73(1), pp. 228–233. 
Abel, Andrew and Janice Eberly (1996). “Optimal investment with costly reversibility”. The 
Review of Economic Studies 63(4), pp. 581–593. 
Alexopoulos, Michelle and John Cohen (2009, February). “Uncertain times, uncertain 
measures”. Working Paper 352, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. 
Arellano, Cristina, Bai, Yan and Patrick Kehoe (2010), “Financial markets and fluctuations in 
Uncertainty”, Federal Reserve Bank of Minnesota Research Department Staff Report. 
Bachmann, Rudi and Giuseppe Moscarini (2011). “Business cycles and endogenous 
uncertainty”, Yale University Mimeo 
Bachmann, Rudi, Steffen Elstner, and Erik Sims (2010). “Uncertainty and economic activity: 
Evidence from business survey data”. NBER Working Paper 16143. 
Baker, Scott and Nicholas Bloom (2011). “Does uncertainty drive business cycles? using 
disasters as natural experiments”. NBER Working Paper 19475. 
Baker, Scott, Nicholas. Bloom, and Steve Davis (2012). "Measuring economic policy 
uncertainty". Stanford University mimeo. 
Bansal, Ravi and Amir Yaron (2004). Risks for the long run: A potential resolution of asset 
pricing puzzles. The Journal of Finance 59(4), pp. 1481–1509. 
Bar-Ilan, Avner and William Strange (1996), “Investment lags”, The American Economic 
Review 86(3), pp. 610–622. 
Basu, Susanto and Brent Bundick (2011, September), “Uncertainty shocks in a model of 
effective demand”, Boston College Working Papers in Economics 774. 
Bekaert, Geert, Marie Hoerova and Marco Lo Duca (2013). “Risk, Uncertainty, and 
Monetary Policy,” Journal of Monetary Economics 60(7). 
Bernanke, Ben (1983). Irreversibility, uncertainty, and cyclical investment. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 98(1), pp. 85–106. 
Bertola, Giuseppe, Luigi Guiso, and Luigi Pistaferri(2005) “Uncertainty and consumer durables 
adjustment” The Review of Economic Studies 72(4), pp. 973–1007. 
Bloom, Nicholas (2009). “The impact of uncertainty shocks”. Econometrica 77(3), pp. 623--685. 
Bloom, Nicholas Bond, Steve and Van Reenen, John (2007), "Uncertainty and Investment 
Dynamics", Review of Economic Studies. 
Bloom, Nicholas, Max Floetotto, Nir Jaimovich, Itay Saporta-Eksten, and Stephen Terry (2012). 
“Really uncertain business cycles”, NBER WP 18245. 
Brennan, Michael and Schwartz, Eduardo, (1985), “Evaluating natural resource investments”, 
The Journal of Business, Vol 58(2), pp135-157. 
Campbell, John Martin Lettau, Burt Malkiel, & Xu Yi (2001) “Have individual stocks become 
more volatile? An empirical exploration of idiosyncratic risk”, Journal of Finance, pp. 1-43. 
Carroll, Chris and William Dunn (1997). “Unemployment expectations, jumping (s,S) triggers, 
and household balance sheets”. In NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1997, Volume 12, NBER 
Chapters, pp. 165–230. National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 
Christiano, Larry, Roberto Motto, and Massimo Rostagno (2014). “Financial factors in economic 
fluctuations”, forthcoming American Economic Review 
Cooper, Russell and Haltiwanger, John (2006), “On the nature of capital adjustment costs”, 
Review of Economic Studies, 73, 611-633. 
D'Erasmo, Pablo and Hernan Moscoso-Boedo (2012), “Intangibles and Endogenous Firm 
Volatility over the Business Cycle”, Maryland mimeo. 
21 
 
Davis, Steve, John Haltiwanger, Ron Jarmin, and Javier Miranda (2006) "Volatility and 
Dispersion in Business Growth Rates: Publicly Traded versus Privately Held Firms".  NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual. 
Dixit, Avinash and Robert Pindyck (1994). Investment under uncertainty. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Eberly, Janice (1994). Adjustment of consumers’ durables stocks: Evidence from automobile 
purchases. Journal of Political Economy 102(3), pp. 403–436. 
Fajgelbaum, Pablo, Schaal, Eduardo and Taschereau-Dumouchel, Mathieu, (2013), “Uncertainty 
traps”, UCLA mimeo. 
Fernandez-Villaverde, Jesus, Pablo Guerron-Quintana, Juan Rubio-Ramirez, and Martin Uribe 
(2011). Risk matters: the real effects of volatility shocks. The American Economic Review 
101(6), 2530-- 2561. 
Fernandez-Villaverde, Jesus, Pablo Guerron-Quintana, Keith Kuester and Juan Rubio-Ramirez, 
(2013), “Fiscal volatility shocks and economic activity”, Penn mimeo. 
Foote, Chris, Erik Hurst, and John Leahy (2000). “Testing the (s, s) model”. American Economic 
Review 90(2), 116–119. 
Gilchrist, Simon, Jae Sim, and Egon Zakrajsek (2011). “Uncertainty, financial frictions and 
investment dynamics”. Working Paper. 
Guiso, Luigi and Guiso Parigi (1999), “Investment and demand uncertainty”, The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics. 
Guvenen, Fatih, Serdar Ozkan and Jae Song (2013), “The Nature of Countercyclical Income 
Risk”, Minnesota mimeo.  
Handley, Kyle and Limao, Nuno (2012), “Trade and Investment under policy uncertainty: 
Theory and Firm Evidence”, NBER working paper 17790. 
Hartman, Richard (1972). “The effects of price and cost uncertainty on investment”. Journal of 
Economic Theory 5(2), 258 – 266. 
Heathcote, Jonathan, Perri, Fabrizio and Violante, Gianluca (2010), “Unequal we stand: an 
empirical analysis of economic inequality in the United States: 1967-2006”, Review of 
Economic Dynamics, 13(1), 15-51.  
Ilut, Cosmin and Martin Schneider (2011). “Ambiguous business cycles”, NBER WP 17900 
Jurado, Kyle, Ludvigson, Sydney and Ng, Serena, (2013), “Measuring uncertainty”, Columbia 
mimeo. 
King, Robert and Sergio Rebelo (1999), "Resuscitating Real Business Cycles", in Handbook of 
Macroeconomics, John B. Taylor and Michael Woodford (eds.), Elsevier. 
Koren, Miklos, and Tenreyro, Sylvania (2007), “Volatility and Development”, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 122(1), pp 243-287. 
Kehrig, Matthias. (2011). “The cyclicality of productivity dispersion”. US Census Bureau Center 
for Economic Studies Paper No. CES-WP-11-15. 
Kydland, Fynn and Edward Prescott (1982), "Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations", 
Econometrica 50 (6), 1345-1370 
Leahy, John and Toni Whited (1996). “The effect of uncertainty on investment: Some stylized 
facts”. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 28(1), pp. 64–83. 
Leduc, Sylvan and Liu, Zhang, (2012), “Uncertainty shocks are aggregate demand shocks”, 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Working Paper 2012-10. 
Malmendier, Ulrike and Tate, Geoff, (2005), “CEO overconfidence and corporate investment”, 
Journal of Finance, vol 60(6), pp 2661-2700. 
22 
 
McDonald, Rob and Daniel Siegel (1986). “The value of waiting to invest”. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 101(4), 707. 
Nakamura, Emi, Sergeyev, Dmitriy and Steinsson, Jon, “Growth-rate and uncertainty shocks in 
consumption: Cross-country evidence”, Columbia mimeo. 
Nickell, Steve (1986): “Dynamic Models of Labor Demand,” in Handbook of Labor Economics, 
Vol. 1, ed. by O. Ashenfelter and R. Layard. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Novy, Dennis and Taylor, Alan (2012), "Why is trade so volatile? The great trade collapse 
2008/09", University of Virginia mimeo 
Oi, Walter (1961). “The desirability of price instability under perfect competition”, 
Econometrica 29(1), pp. 58–64. 
Orlik, Anna and Veldkamp, Anna (2013), “Understanding uncertainty shocks and the role of the 
black swan”, NYU mimeo. 
Paddock, James, Daniel Siegel, & James Smith, (1988), “Option Valuation Claims on Real 
Assets: The Case of Offshore Petroleum Leases,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 479-508 
Panousi, Vasia and Dimitri Papanikolaou (2012). “Investment, idiosyncratic risk, and 
ownership”. Journal of Finance, pp 1113-1148. 
Pastor, Lubos. and Pietro Veronesi (2011, September). “Political uncertainty and risk premia”. 
Working Paper 17464, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Ramey, Gary and Valerie Ramey (1995). “Cross-country evidence on the link between volatility 
and growth”. The American Economic Review 85(5), pp. 1138–1151. 
Ramey, Valerie and Matthew Shapiro, (2001). "Displaced Capital: A Study of Aerospace Plant 
Closings," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 109(5), pages 958-992, October 
Romer, Christina. (1990). “The great crash and the onset of the great depression”. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 105(3), pp. 597–624. 
Schwert, William (1989). “Why does stock market volatility change over time?”, The Journal of 
Finance 44(5), pp. 1115–1153. 
Scotti, Chiara (2013), “Surprise and uncertainty indexes: real-time aggregation of real-activity 
macro surprises”, Federal Reserve Board mimeo 
Stock, James and Watson, Mark (2002), “Has the business cycle changed and why?”, NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual.  
Gill Segal, Ivan Shaliastovich, Amir Yaron, 2013, “Good and Bad Uncertainty: Macroeconomic 
and Financial Market Implications”, Wharton mimeo. 
Schaal, Edouard, “Uncertainty, productivity and unemployment in the great recession”, NYU 
mimeo.  
Segal, Shaliastovich and Yaron (2013), “Good and Bad Uncertainty”, Wharton mimeo. 
Stein, Luke and Elizabeth Stone (2011). “The Effect of Uncertainty on Investment, Hiring, and 
R&D: Causal Evidence from Equity Options”, Stanford mimeo 
Storesletten, K., C. I. Telmer, and A. Yaron (2004). Cyclical dynamics in idiosyncratic labor 
market risk. Journal of Political Economy 112(3), pp. 695–717. 
Valletta, Rob  and Bengali, Leila (2013), “What’s behind the increase in part-time work?”, San 
Francisco Federal Reserve Bank Economic Letter, August 26, 2013. 
Van Nieuwerburgh, Stijn and Veldkamp, Laura (2006), "Learning asymmetries in real business 
cycles", Journal of Monetary Economics, 53(4), 753-772. 
Vavra, Joseph (2013), “Inflation dynamics and time-varying uncertainty: new-evidence and an 
Ss interpretation”, Chicago mimeo. 
World Bank Development Report (2013), “Risk and Opportunity”, World Bank Press 
10
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
V
I
X
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
o
f
 
3
0
-
d
a
y
 
s
t
o
c
k
-
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
i
m
p
l
i
e
d
 
v
o
l
a
t
i
l
i
t
y
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
Figure 1: Stock-market implied volatility is 58% higher in recessions
Source: VIX implied volatility on the S&P500, averaged to the quarterly level.  Values are reported in standard-deviations on the 
S&P 500 at an annualized level. Grey bars are NBER recessions. Data spans 1990Q1-2013Q4.
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